What Stalin Did and Why He Did It

3/10/1939

The 18th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was held from March 10-21, 1939 in Moscow. In his report and speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the 18th Party Congress on March 10, 1939, Josef Stalin outlined the Soviet Union's international position.  Stalin noted that Italy, Germany and Japan had already started a new imperialist war by their aggressive actions.  In 1935, Italy seized Abyssinia; in the summer of 1936, Germany and Italy staged armed intervention in the Spanish civil war; in 1937, Japan invaded Northern and Central China; in the beginning of 1938, Germany annexed Austria; and in the autumn of 1938, Germany seized the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia, with the agreement of Great Britain and France.

Stalin’s March 10, 1939 speech stressed that the aggressor nations (Germany, Italy and Japan) were seriously infringing upon the interests of non-aggressor nations (particularly Great Britain, France and the U.S.A.), yet the latter nations kept retreating and making concession after concession to the aggressor nations.  According to Stalin, the chief reason for making these concessions was that the Western governments refused to adopt a policy of collective security (which the Soviet Union had been advocating for years, primarily through the efforts of Commisar for Foreign Relations Maxim Litvinov) and adhered, instead, to a policy of non-interference.  This non-interference policy, Stalin stressed, was tantamount to connivance with aggression.  The Western policy of non-interference was indicative of a desire not to hinder the aggressors, in Stalin’s words, “not to hinder, say, Japan in getting involved in a war with China, or better still with the Soviet Union; not to hinder, say, Germany in getting bogged down in her European adventures, getting involved in a war with the Soviet Union; to give all the participants a chance to sink deep into the mire of war, to encourage them in this on the quiet, to let them weaken and exhaust each other and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to appear fresh on the scene, to appear, of course, 'in the interests of peace' and to dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war.”

What follows is the relevant portion of Stalin's March 10, 1939 speech.  It is evident from Stalin's speech that he considered war in Europe inevitable, and that he wished to ally the Soviet Union with the Western powers (Great Britain and France) against the aggressor power (Nazi Germany).  Unlike the British and French leadership at the time, Stalin correctly evaluated the developing global and European conflict, and the threat posed by a strengthened Germany.  And Stalin made it clear in his March 10, 1939 speech that the Soviet Union could not be counted upon to idly sit by while Great Britain and France sat by watching Nazi Germany expanding its power to the East, towards the Soviet Union. Stalin read the situation correctly. Stalin once again was asking Great Britain and France to stand up to Nazi Germany and ally with the Soviet Union, and not to neglect the Soviet Union with the expectation that their appeasement/non-interference policy towards Germany would pay dividends in the form of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union:

    “Here is a list of the most important events during the period under review which mark the beginning of the new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Abyssinia. In the summer of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in Spain, Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain and in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of Spain and in the Balearic Islands. Having seized Manchuria, Japan in 1937 invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan seized Canton, and at the beginning of 1939 the Island of Hainan.”

    “Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the nations, has drawn over five hundred million people into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, through Abyssinia, to Gibraltar.”

    “After the [First World War,] the victor states, primarily Britain, France and the United States, had set up a new regime in the relations between countries, the post-war regime of peace. The main props of this regime were the Nine-Power Pact in the Far East, and the Versailles Treaty and a number of other treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was set up to regulate relations between countries within the framework of this regime, on the basis of a united front of states, of collective defense of the security of states. However, three aggressive states [i.e., Germany, Italy and Japan], and the new imperialist war launched by them, have upset the entire system of this post-war peace regime.”

    “Japan tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and Italy the Versailles Treaty. In order to have their hands free, these three states withdrew from the League of Nations. The new imperialist war became a fact.”

    “It is not so easy in our day to suddenly break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the fascist rulers. That is why the fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it.”

    “A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a bloc? "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome axis"; that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. (Laughter.) A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind. "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; that is, a slight penchant for geometry. (General laughter.) A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don't believe it, read the "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan.”

    “That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous this whole clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. (Laughter.)”
   
    “But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain - and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive states [i.e., Great Britain and France].”

    “The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.”

    “It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.”
   
    “Thus, we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance, on the part of the latter. Incredible, but true.”
   
    “To what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war? How is it that the non-aggressive countries, which possess such vast opportunities, have so easily, and without any resistance, abandoned their positions and their obligations to please the aggressors? Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the nonaggressive states? Of course not. Combined, the nonaggressive, democratic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, both economically and in the military sense.”
   
    “To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these states to the aggressors? It might be attributed, for example, to the fear that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive states were to go to war and the war were to assume world-wide proportions. The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imperialist world war [i.e., the First World War] led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries [i.e., Russia]. They are afraid that the second imperialist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or several countries.”
   
    “But, at present, this is not the sole or even the chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention, a position of "neutrality.”

    “Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims." But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work : not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union : to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this, to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents. Cheap and easy!”
   
    “Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before Japan invaded North China all the influential French and British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her army could subjugate China in two or three months. Then, the European and American politicians began to watch and wait. And then, when Japan started military operations, they let her have Shanghai, the vital center of foreign capital in China; they let her have Canton, a center of Britain's monopoly influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround Hong Kong. Does not this look very much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though they were saying : 'Embroil yourself deeper in war; then we shall see.'”

    “Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region [of Czechoslovakia]; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them : "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.”
   
    “The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.”

    “It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough straitjackets for them in our country. (Thunderous applause.) But, if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish to seriously talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? ...”
   
    “Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther East, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the West and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades.”
   
    “Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics ....”
   
    “It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them. Such is the true face of the prevailing policy of non-intervention. Such is the political situation in the capitalist countries.”
   
    “The war has created a new situation with regard to the relations between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. By undermining the post-war peace regime and overriding the elementary principles of international law, it has cast doubt on the value of international treaties and obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes are dead and buried. Feverish [re]arming has taken their place.”

    “Everybody is arming, small states and big states, including primarily those which practise the policy of non-intervention. Nobody believes any longer in the unctuous speeches which claim that the Munich concessions to the aggressors and the Munich agreement opened a new era of "appeasement." They are disbelieved even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, Britain and France, who are increasing their armaments no less than other countries.”

    “Naturally, the [Soviet Union] could not ignore these ominous events. There is no doubt that any war, however small, started by the aggressors in any remote corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peacable countries. All the more serious then is the danger arising from the new imperialist war, which has already drawn into its orbit over five hundred million people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of this, while our country is unswervingly pursuing a policy of preserving peace, it is at the same time doing a great deal to increase the preparedness of our Red Army and our Red Navy.”

    “At the same time, in order to strengthen its international position, the Soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. At the end of 1934, our country joined the League of Nations, considering that, despite its weakness, the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed, and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union considers that in alarming times like these, even so weak an international organization as the League of Nations should not be ignored. In May 1935, a treaty of mutual assistance against possible attack by aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with Czechoslovakia. In March 1936, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. In August 1937, the Soviet Union concluded a pact of non-aggression with the Chinese Republic.”
   
    “It was in such difficult international conditions that the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy of upholding the cause of peace. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit:
   
    1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.
   
    2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries which have common frontiers with the [Soviet Union]. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.
   
    3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.
   
    4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.
   
    Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. (Loud and prolonged applause.)"
   
    "In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union relies upon:
   
    1. Its growing economic, political and cultural might ...;
   
    4. Its Red Army and Red Navy;
   
    5. Its policy of peace; ...
   
    7. The good sense of the countries which for one reason or another have no interest in the violation of peace....”
   
    “The tasks of the [Soviet Communist] Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:
   
    1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;
   
    2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;
   
    3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost ...”

Source: "Marxists Internet Archive"

Did Stalin hint in his March 9, 1939 speech that he might seek an accommodation with Germany (in the form of a non-aggression pact), if Britain and France would not ally with the Soviet Union. Perhaps. Regardless of whether Stalin so hinted, Britain and France had it within their power to form a real and effective alliance with the Soviet Union which, had Poland allowed Soviet troops to transit eastern Poland to fight the Germans, certainly would have deterred Hitler and Germany from invading Poland and starting the Second World War.


3/11/1939

Another sharp condemnation of the aggressive acts of Germany, Italy and Japan was made at the 18th Party Congress by Dmitry Manuilsky, Vice-President of the Comintern. He pointed out that the aggressive powers "are exploiting the servility of the ruling circles of Great Britain and France and are making them accomplices in their crimes...." Manuilsky noted that the British intended "to turn Germany towards the East—against the Soviet Union,—by sacrificing the small nations of Southeastern Europe to German fascism". Noting that the Munich deal was the first serious attempt to put this insidious plan into practice, Manuilsky stated that at Munich, the British and French had freed the hands of the aggressors. (Pravda, March 12, 1939).


3/15/1939

Nazi Germany, having attained a dominating position in Central Europe as a result of the Munich agreement, now had a free hand to continue its aggression. On March 15, 1939, German troops occupied the primarily Czech portions of Czechoslovakia not ceded to Germany in the Munich agreement (Bohemia and Moravia), and thereby eliminated Czechoslovakia as an independent state in Central Europe.  At 3:55 a.m., Wednesday, March 15, Czech President Hácha signed the document stating he had "confidently placed the fate of the Czech people and country in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich." Two hours later, amid a late winter snowstorm, the German Army rolled into the first non-Germanic territory to be taken by the Nazis. "Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist!" Hitler announced to the German people later that day, just before departing for Prague. That evening, Hitler made his long-awaited entry into Prague at the head of 10-vehicle convoy. But there were no cheering crowds. The streets of Prague were deserted. Hitler spent the night in Prague's Hradschin Castle, former home to the Kings of Bohemia.

Carpatho-Ukraine (referred to as the "Carpathian Ukraine" by the Soviet Union, and referred to as, "Ruthenia", "Carpathian Ruthenia", "Transcarpathian Ruthenia", "Transcarpathian Ukraine", "Subcarpathian Rus", and "Subcarpathia" by others) was an autonomous region within Czechoslovakia from late 1938 until March 15, 1939. On March 15, 1939, Carpatho-Ukraine declared itself to be an independent Ukrainian republic. However, it was invaded and occupied by Hungary between March 15-18, 1939, and would remain under Hungarian control until the Nazi Occupation of Hungary in 1944. The British and French ruling circles had regarded the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine as a suitable spring-board for Germany to invade the Ukraine, as it directly connected German-occupied Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Ukraine. However, Hungary seized the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine with the blessing of the German government. With Hungary's seizure of the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, German-occupied Czechoslovakia would not have territorial contiguity with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Germany once again began making demands for the return of her former colonies, which had been ceded to Great Britain and France after the First World War. Contrary to the hopes of the British and French ruling circles, German aggression was not limited to the East, but also was directed towards the Western powers.


3/17/1939

On March 17, 1939, Romanian envoy to London Virgil Tilea informed British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Halifax (Lord Halifax) that within the prior few days, Germany had demanded exclusive rights to purchase Romanian exports. The Romanian government viewed these demands as very much resembling an ultimatum, said Tilea, and Romania wanted to know what the British government's position would be if Romania became the next victim of German aggression. Tilea stated that it was possible to form a bloc consisting of Poland, Romania, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, and if this bloc was supported by Great Britain and France, the situation could be saved. (Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series [D.B.F.P.] Vol. IV, pp. 366-367). ]It was later revealed that Tilea had raised this question on his own initiative without any instructions from his government in Bucharest.] Lord Halifax immediately sent telegrams to British diplomatic representatives in France, Poland, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, informing them of Tilea's proposal and asking them to find out what views the respective governments had on this question (D.B.F.P., Vol. IV, pp. 360-361). Halifax also informed William Seeds, the British ambassador in Moscow, of Tilea's inquiry. He instructed Seeds to ask the Soviet government whether it would be able to provide Romania with assistance against German aggression were the Romanian government to ask for it (D.B.F.P., Vol. IV, pp. 360-361).


3/18/1939

On March 18, 1939, Lord Halifax spoke with Ivan Maisky (the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain), and told him that the Romanian envoy in London, Tilea, had spoken to him about Germany's ultimatum to Romania and "asked him about British aid to Romania in the event of aggression by Germany". Halifax's reply was described by Ambassador Maisky in a dispatch to Moscow: "Halifax promised Tiles that he would discuss the problem immediately with the British government and then give him an answer. Before making ifs decision, however, the British government would like .to ascertain the position of the [Soviet Union] on this question. It is interested in knowing whether Romania can count on assistance from the [Soviet Union] in the event of German aggression, in what form and on what scale (that is, could she count on only arms and ammunition and so forth, or on more active military support?)" (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

On the same day, British Ambassador to the Soviet William Seeds approached Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov with a similar inquiry. To the statement that the British government, before coming to a decision, wanted to find out whether the Soviet government was prepared to provide assistance to Romania, Litvinov responded that the Soviet government might also feel the need, before answering his question, "to know the position of others, including Great Britain, yet Halifax's inquiry contains no indications on this score" (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

It should also be noted that whereas the British government had informed all the other governments interested of the fact that Tilea had suggested the creation of a bloc consisting of Poland, Romania, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, to be supported by Great Britain and France, it concealed this piece of information from the Soviet government. Furthermore, the other governments interested were asked simply to express their views, whereas the question as put to the Soviet government concerned whether it would be willing to commit unilateral military support to Romania.

The British government's position with respect of Romania was set forth in a talk between Lord Halifax and the U.S. Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy: Halifax admitted that he was not sure whether Chamberlain and the British government wanted to include Romania among the countries in whose defense Great Britain was ready to go to war. (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers [F.R.U.S.] 1939, Vol. I, p. 99. Telegram from Kennedy to the U.S. State Department, dated March 24, 1939).

On the evening of March 18, 1939, Ambassador Seeds was summoned to the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and told that "nothing will come of questions posed by one government about the position of the other and, therefore, a joint consultation is needed". The Soviet government proposed the immediate convocation of a conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey.

In response, "Seeds said that he had just received a copy of a telegram sent to London by the British envoy in Bucharest, who asked that all action be suspended. Seeds does not understand what this means and thinks that the Romanian envoy in Britain must have got something confused" (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.). Seeds' statement amounted to a withdrawal of the British inquiry to the Soviet government. [When the British envoy in Bucharest, Reginald Hoare, received word of the inquiries sent out by Halifax, he immediately went to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was told that Tilea had done this "in an excess of zeal...." Hoare then asked Halifax to rescind the instructions given to Seeds and other British representatives abroad (D.B.F.P., Vol. IV, pp. 369-370)].

The Soviet government reacted sharply to Germany's full occupation of Czechoslovakia. On March 18, 1939, the Soviet Union sent the German government a note stating that Germany's actions "cannot be judged other than as arbitrary, forcible and aggressive", that this act had "destroyed political stability in Central Europe, increased the elements of alarm already created earlier in Europe, and struck a new blow to the peoples' feeling of security". In light of these considerations, the Soviet note continued, the Soviet government could not recognize the inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the German Reich (lzvestia, March 20, 1939).

After seizing Czechoslovakia, the Nazis increased their pressure on Romania and then on Poland. The aggressive acts of Nazi Germany (meeting no real resistance from Britain and France, despite repeated requests from the Soviet government to form a solid front against such aggression) now posed a serious threat to the national security of the Soviet Union.


3/19/1939

The events occurring in the area formerly comprising Czechoslovakia caused increasing alarm in Britain and particularly in France. The French Ambassador to Germany, Robert Coulondre, for example, stated in a letter dated March 19, 1939, that it was not impossible that Germany—in keeping with the classical doctrine of the German General Staff and the views outlined by Hitler in "Mein Kampf"—before going East, might first turn to the West in order to crush France. (Documents Diplomatiques 1938-1939, Paris, 1939, p. 89).

On March 19, 1939, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in London (Ivan Maisky) that the Czechoslovak events had evidently stirred public opinion in both Great Britain and France, but that it nevertheless must be anticipated that "Chamberlain and Daladier will again defend the Munich line. They have by no means given up yet". Although what had happened in Czechoslovakia and the ultimatum to Romania may have disturbed Chamberlain and Daladier some, Litvinov believed that these events nonetheless "fully coincide with their fond visions of Germany moving towards the East". (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.)

To continue their Munich policy with better chances of success, the British and French governments sought ways to make Hitler more tractable. After Hitler conquered what remained of the Czech state, Britain and France began to publicly strengthen their political and military ties with Poland, Turkey, Greece and other European nations. They also publicly stated that they were interested in a "rapprochement" with the Soviet Union. However, based on the events that transpired in the following five (5) months, it appears that the British and French governments did not genuinely desire to cooperate with the Soviet Union in curbing Nazi aggression and made no real moves towards this objective. It appears, in retrospect, that the British and French governments looked upon their contacts with the Soviet Union primarily as a lever to apply pressure on Germany. Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador to Britain in London, observed that "Britain is seeking to strengthen herself and put herself on a level with the Axis [powers] by arming and acquiring allies, but at the same time she wants to come to an amicable agreement with Germany through negotiations." (Documents and Materials on the Eve of the Second World War, Vol. II, 1948, p. 206).

On March 19, 1939, Soviet Ambassador Maisky in London reported to the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that Lord Halifax had informed him that he had already consulted with Prime Minister Chamberlain on the question of the proposed six-power conference and "they concluded that such action would be premature" (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

On March 19, 1939, Lord Halifax told Soviet Ambassador Maisky that he wanted to suggest that the Soviet Union, France and Poland "publish a joint Declaration to the effect that all the above-named powers are interested in safeguarding the integrity and sovereignty of the states in Eastern and Southeastern Europe". He explained that he intended also to invite Turkey, Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and certain other countries to join in the Declaration (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).


3/20/1939

On March 20, 2939, the Soviet government's proposal was transmitted to the French government. (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.) But the Soviet proposal for a six-power conference was declined by the British government.

Summing up the events of the previous week in a dispatch dated March 20, 1939, Soviet Ambassador to Britain Ivan Maisky informed Moscow that anti-German feelings in Great Britain were stronger than ever before, and that there appeared to be a desire of the British people for cooperation with the Soviet Union for the formation of a bloc of peaceful nations. However, Maisky's dispatch stressed, these factors should not be overestimated: "As long as [Prime Minister] Chamberlain remains at the head of the government, it should not be anticipated that there will be any substantial change in the British foreign policy line. It is true that the Prime Minister has completely failed in his Munich policy and that his prestige has suffered a severe blow, but in his heart he is without doubt still ready to play the same old tune, and it is only public opinion that prevents him from doing so. Consequently, Chamberlain is playing for time and maneuvering." (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

Despite the appearance of some new elements in Anglo-French diplomacy in the Spring of 1939 (following the German takeover of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government understood well the double game being played by Chamberlain and Daladier. Nevertheless, it was still ready to cooperate with Britain and France had their policy actually changed. Outlining the position of the Soviet Union, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov wrote in a letter on March 20, 1939: "The Soviet Union is in a better position than any other country to provide for the defense of its own borders, but it still does not refuse to cooperate with other countries. It conceives of such cooperation only in terms of joining in actual common efforts to resist the aggressors." (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

Maxim Litvinov

The Soviet government believed that the only thing that could still stop Hitler and Nazi aggression and prevent a world war was genuine and effective cooperation between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and other nations threatened with German aggression. Such cooperation, it was believed, could guarantee peace and security in Europe and beyond it. During the entire course of diplomatic and military talks between the Soviet Union, Britain and France in the Spring and Summer of 1939, the Soviet government sought to establish a firm basis for equitable and mutually acceptable agreements to stop further aggression in Europe and to prevent the world from slipping into war.  Unfortunately, the positions taken by the British and French governments impeded efforts at establishing a reliable united peace front. By adhering to their policy of appeasement, the ruling circles of Great Britain and France paved the way for Nazi Germany to unleash a new world war.


3/21/1939

On March 21, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union William Seeds submitted to the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs the following draft Declaration of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and Poland: “We, the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, hereby declare that, inasmuch as peace and security in Europe are matters of common interest and concern, and since European peace and security may be affected by any action which constitutes a threat to the political independence of any European State, our respective Governments hereby undertake immediately to consult together as to what steps should be taken to offer joint resistance to any such action.” (D.B.F.P., Vol. IV, p. 427). [Seeds later described this draft statement as a “rather academic declaration.” (D.B.F.P., Vol. 1V, p. 461).  It was quite obvious that the proposed Declaration could not serve as a serious means of resistance against the growing threat of German aggression, but believing that even such a Declaration might at least be a small step towards preserving peace and the balance of power, the Soviet government agreed to accept the British proposal.

Meanwhile, Nazi aggression was spreading to other regions of Europe.  On March 21, 1939, the German government confronted Poland with the question of turning Danzig over to Germany and laying a “corridor” to Eastern Prussia through Polish territory.


3/22/1939

On the day following reception of the British draft, the Soviet government expressed its readiness to sign the Declaration.  On March 22, 1939, the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs informed British Ambassador Seeds as follows: “We express our solidarity with the British government’s position and accept the wording of its draft Declaration.  Representatives of the Soviet Government will sign the Declaration without delay as soon as France and Poland accept the British proposal and promise their signatures.”  The Soviet government suggested that, in order to make the document "especially solemn and binding" it should be signed by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the four powers.  It also suggested that an invitation to join in the Declaration be made not only to the Balkan countries mentioned by Lord Halifax, but also to Finland and the Baltic and Scandinavian countries (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

On March 22, 1939, the Nazis forced Lithuania to hand over to Germany its Klaipeda (Memel) region. 


3/23/1939

Romania signed an unequal economic agreement with Germany.

On March 23, 1939, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, told the Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, that there was no answer yet from Warsaw on the question of signing the Declaration, but that, in preliminary talks, the Poles had indicated that there were “two points that cause them to hesitate: (1) by signing the Declaration, Poland would join in an anti-German front, but in return gets only vague promises of consultation; and (2) inasmuch as the Declaration would also be signed by the Soviet Union, it provided the impression that Poland was joining a specific “ideological front”. (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.)

On March 23, 1939, the U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, Anthony Biddle, sent a telegram to the U.S. State Department indicating that Poland, which had a pact with Romania against the Soviet Union,  did not intend to come to the aid of her ally, Romania, in the event the latter was involved in war with Germany  (F.R.U.S., 1939, Vol. I, pp. 96-97).


3/24/1939

Reporting on the Polish and Romanian positions at that time, U.S. Ambassador in London Joseph Kennedy wrote on March 24, 1939 that “considerable doubt emerged as to the willingness of Poland and Romania to defend themselves against German encroachment or attack”.  Kennedy also expressed doubts as to "whether [the British] Government and France really meant business.” (D.B.F.P., Vol. IV, p. 499).

The Soviet government, meanwhile, was making it clear that it was prepared to join in a common front against Nazi aggression in close cooperation with Britain and France, as well as with the East European countries that were being threatened.


3/26/1939

On March 26, 1939, the Deputy head of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Potemkin, told the Romanian envoy to Moscow, Nicolae Dianu, that the Soviet government accepted the British-sponsored Declaration, although it was believed to be ineffective in its current form.  (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

The alarm that now gripped the British and French ruling circles was described in dispatches from Soviet embassies in both countries to the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow.  On March 26, 1939, the Soviet embassy in Paris, through Ambassador Yakov Surits, informed Moscow that those who had been behind the Munich appeasement policy were now forced to admit that "Britain and France were duped and deceived at Munich and the Munich agreement ended up being just as much a scrap of paper as all previous papers bearing Germany's signature". Whereas the Munich agreement had been represented "as the end to German claims in Europe, as the establishment of new forms of cooperation between the two competing axes", the German's seizure of non-German Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1939 "dispelled all these illusions and shattered the house built at Munich." Whereas Germany's seizure of East European countries had earlier been seen by the West as German preparation for an advance against the Soviet Union, Surits wrote that "it is now necessary to give an ear to the diametrically opposite opinion". Having obtained these nations' resources, it was possible that Hitler "will lose all economic interest in the Ukraine" and would not want to risk war with the Soviet Union. Surits wrote: "That [Hitler] considers war with the [Soviet Union] a risk, and no small risk, is an opinion expressed by absolutely everyone here." Surits further reported that "the opinion becoming predominant here [in Paris] is that the next German blow will be struck at the West and that it will he France that will bear the brunt of this blow". (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.)

The British and French governments saw their ties with the East European countries and their contacts with the Soviet Union as a kind of counter-insurance, in the event that their attempts to negotiate with Hitler proved fruitless and they found themselves at war with Germany. The Soviet ambassador in Paris, Iakov Surits, wrote to Moscow on March 26, 1939: "It is not necessary, I think, to remind anyone that the best way out for the Munich men [i.e., the British and French governments] is to involve us [the Soviet Union] in a war with Germany." "But", Surits wrote, "if despite all their efforts, war breaks out somewhere else, and if the aggressor, instead of moving in the direction pointed out to him by the 'Munich men', actually attacks the 'Munich men' themselves, then, of course, they will accept assistance from the [Soviet Union]" (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

That this was the case is corroborated by other diplomatic documents as well. The German Ambassador in London, Dirksen, for example, remarked around this time that, as far as the British government was concerned, "ties with other states are but a reserve", and "these ties will be broken as soon as the only important and worthy goal has been reached—agreement with Germany" (Documents, Vol. 11, p. 142).

3/28/1939

On March 28, 1939, the German press launched a vicious anti-Polish campaign on the position of the German minority in Poland.  Reports began coming in about German troop movements along the Polish border and about the likelihood that the Germans would seize Danzig within a matter of days.  Britain and France could not but take into account that the seizure of Poland would seriously complicate and weaken their position.


3/29/1939

On March 29, 1939, the Polish ambassador to Great Britain, Edward Raczyńnski, wrote to the Polish government that the British advocates of appeasement towards Germany held the view that "Great Britain should limit herself to the defense of Western Europe, and, naturally, of the British Empire and imperial communications. On the other hand, Central and Eastern Europe should be a sphere of German expansion.... It was anticipated that the situation would lead to war between Russia and Germany, which would weaken them both and not be without direct advantages for the Western powers" (Auswartiges Amt. Polnische Dokuntente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges. Berlin, 1940, p. 30).

After seizing Czechoslovakia, the Nazis increased their pressure on Romania and then on Poland. The aggressive acts of Nazi Germany (meeting no real resistance from Britain and France, despite repeated requests from the Soviet government to form a solid front against such aggression) now posed a serious threat to the national security of the Soviet Union.

At the end of March, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs issued a statement to Latvian and Estonian representatives emphasizing the immense importance that the Soviet Union attached to preventing the aggressors from dominating the Baltic republics counter to the vital interests of the Soviet Union as well as of the Baltic states themselves.  The Soviet government declared that it could not remain indifferent to German domination over the Baltic region and would show this by actions if necessary (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

Meanwhile, the Romanian envoy in Moscow, Dianu, was informed that the Soviet Union could not “remain indifferent were an aggressive country to gain domination in Romania or be provided with bases near our borders or in Black Sea ports” (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.),

On March 29, 1939, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov, in reply to an inquiry made by the French Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, Jean Payart, concerning the Soviet Union’s readiness to cooperate with Poland, informed him: “We consider cooperation with Poland, which we have always offered her, very important.”  (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.) [However, at the same time, Litvinov expressed apprehension that “it is unlikely that [Polish Foreign Minister Jozef] Beck’s line of conduct can be changed so long as Germany does strike a direct blow at Poland.” (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.)

On March 29, 1939, British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, informed Soviet Ambassador Maisky that “the Poles quite categorically, and the Romanians somewhat less decisively, have announced that they will not join any combination (be it in the form of a declaration or any other) that also includes the [Soviet Union].  Moreover, they made it clear that a ‘consultation’ in no way accommodates them and that they can join a peace bloc only if there are firm military commitments from Great Britain and France.”  (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.). 

On March 29, 1939, the British Ambassador in Poland, Howard Kennard, was instructed by his government to inform the Polish government that Germany might launch a direct attack against Poland or undermine her sovereignty "whether by processes of economic penetration or national disintegration, as in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, or by indirect military pressure."  In such an event, the instructions said, Britain and France would be prepared to come to Poland's assistance (D.B.F.P., Vol. IV, p. 516).


3/31/1939

On March 31, 1939, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced in the British House of Commons that "in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power."  (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 45, col. 2421.).

Later that day, Soviet Ambassador in London Ivan Maisky met former British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who told him about a talk that he had with Chamberlain after the latter had made his speech to the House of Commons.  Lloyd George had asked Chamberlain about the participation of the Soviet Union in a bloc of anti-Nazi powers, to which the Prime Minister had replied that the position taken by Poland and Rumania so far made the practical involvement of the Soviet Union somewhat difficult.

Then Lloyd George asked why, under such circumstances, Chamberlain had risked making his statement threatening to involve Britain in a war with Germany.  Chamberlain replied, that, according to information at his disposal, neither the German General Staff nor Hitler would ever risk war if they knew that they would have to fight at the same time on two fronts—the West and the East.  Lloyd George then asked just where this “second front” was.  Chamberlain answered: “Poland.” [Like Chamberlain, Lord Halifax mistakenly believed that Britain's chief ally in Eastern Europe had to be Poland and not the Soviet Union (F.R.U.S., 1939, Vol. I„ p. 99. Telegram from U.S. Ambassador Kennedy to the State Department, dated March 24, 1939).  Lloyd George burst into laughter and began to gibe Chamberlain, explaining that Poland had no air force to speak of, an inadequately mechanized army, worse than mediocre armaments, and that Poland was weak internally – both economically and politically.  Lloyd George told Chamberlain that without active help from the Soviet Union, “[no] Eastern front's possible".  In conclusion, Lloyd George told Chamberlain that since there was no firm agreement with the Soviet Union, "I consider your statement of today an irresponsible game of chance which can end up very badly" (A.F.P. U.S.S.R.).

Lloyd George

[Lloyd George understood the situation well.  Chamberlain preferred to believe the fantasy of Polish strength, and to ignore the only real power in Eastern Europe that could have created a viable “second front” in 1939, the Soviet Union].